ce
for them to inhere in, we are assur'd that there is a substance where
unto they do belong, or of which they are the Attributes.

Which Attributes of God would not be discoverable by us, did we not
discern a difference in Things; as between _Power_ and _Weakness,
Benevolence_ and _no Benevolence_, or its contrary; and betwixt
directing means to an End, and acting at hap-hazard without any
design, or choice: A knowledge, which, by whatever steps convey'd into
the mind, is no other than a seeing things to be what they are, and
that they cannot but be what they are.

From which diversity and immutability in the Nature of things, there
necessarily arises a diversity of respects and relations between them,
as unchangeable as the things themselves: wherein the Will of the
Creator in reference hereunto is reveal'd to every intelligent Agent,
so far as he is made capable of discerning these relations,
dependencies and consequences; and whatsoever with respect to his own
Actions, such a Being finds resulting from any of these as most
conformable to the design of his Creator in making him such a part as
he is of the whole, he cannot but consider as the Will of God, thereby
dictated to him; since otherwise, God would act contradictiously to
his Wisdom in making him what he is.

We being then indu'd, as we are, with a capacity of perceiving and
distinguishing these differences of Things; and also with a liberty of
acting, or not, suitably and agreeably hereunto; whence we can
according to the preference of our own minds, act either in conformity
to, or disconformity with, the Will of the Creator (manifested in his
Works no less than the Will of any Humane Architect is in his) it
follows, That to act answerably to the nature of such Beings as we
are, requires that we attentively examine, and consider the several
natures of Things, so far as they have any relation to our own
actions.

Which attentive consideration of the Works of God objected to our
view, implies an exercise thereupon of that Faculty in us by which we
deduce, or infer, one thing from another: Whence (as has been said)
our knowledge immediately deriv'd to us from sensation, or reflection,
is inlarg'd by the perception of remote, or distant Truths. The more
obviously eminent advantages accruing to us from which faculty of
reason, plainly make known the Superiority of its Nature; and that its
suggestions, ought to be hearken'd to by us preferably to those of
Sen