in fruitless discussion.

"Orders were at last given for a detachment to be in readiness
at four A.M. at the Kohistan gate; and Captain Bellew,
deputy-assistant quartermaster-general, volunteered to blow
open the gate; another party of H.M.'s 44th were at the same
time to issue by a cut in the south face of the rampart, and
march simultaneously towards the commissariat fort, to
reinforce the garrison. Morning had, however, well dawned ere
the men could be got under arms; and they were on the point of
marching off, when it was reported that Ensign Warren had just
arrived in cantonments with his garrison, having evacuated the
fort. It seems that the enemy had actually set fire to the
gate; and Ensign Warren, seeing no prospect of a reinforcement,
and expecting the enemy every moment to rush in, led out his
men by a hole which he had prepared in the wall. Being called
upon in a public letter from the assistant adjutant-general to
state his reasons for abandoning his post, he replied that he
was ready to do so before a court of enquiry, which he
requested might be assembled to investigate his conduct; it was
not, however, deemed expedient to comply with his request.

"It is beyond a doubt that our feeble and ineffectual defence
of this fort, and the valuable booty it yielded, was the first
_fatal_ blow to our supremacy at Cabul, and at once determined
those chiefs--and more particularly the Kuzzilbashes--who had
hitherto remained neutral, to join in the general combination
to drive us from the country."

"_Nov_. 5.--It no sooner became generally known that the commissariat
fort, upon which we were dependent for supplies, had been abandoned,
than one universal feeling of indignation pervaded the garrison. Nor can
I describe," says Lieutenant Eyre, "the impatience of the troops, but
especially of the native portion, to be led out for its recapture--a
feeling that was by no means diminished by seeing the Affghans crossing
and re-crossing the road between the commissariat fort and the gate of
the _Shah Bagh_, laden with the provisions upon which had depended our
ability to make a protracted defence."

That the whole commissariat should have been deposited in a detached
fort is extraordinary and inexcusable, but that the garrison of that
fort should not have been reinforced, is even more unintelligibl