a
new group of rebellious tribes menaced Fez.

El-Hiba entered Marrakech in August, 1912, and the French consul and
several other French residents were taken prisoner. El-Hiba's forces
then advanced to a point half way between Marrakech and Mazagan, where
General Mangin, at that time a colonial colonel, met and utterly routed
them. The disorder in the south, and the appeals of the native
population for protection against the savage depredations of the new
Mahdist rebels, made it necessary for the French troops to follow up
their success, and in September Marrakech was taken.

Such were the swift and brilliant results of General Lyautey's
intervention. The first difficulties had been quickly overcome; others,
far more complicated, remained. The military occupation of Morocco had
to be followed up by its civil reorganization. By the Franco-German
treaty of 1911 Germany had finally agreed to recognize the French
protectorate in Morocco; but in spite of an apparently explicit
acknowledgment of this right, Germany, as usual, managed to slip into
the contract certain ambiguities of form that were likely to lead to
future trouble.

To obtain even this incomplete treaty France had had to sacrifice part
of her colonies in equatorial Africa; and in addition to the uncertain
relation with Germany there remained the dead weight of the Spanish
zone and the confused international administration of Tangier. The
disastrously misgoverned Spanish zone has always been a centre for
German intrigue and native conspiracies, as well as a permanent obstacle
to the economic development of Morocco.

Such were the problems that General Lyautey found awaiting him. A long
colonial experience, and an unusual combination of military and
administrative talents, prepared him for the almost impossible task of
dealing with them. Swift and decisive when military action is required,
he has above all the long views and endless patience necessary to the
successful colonial governor. The policy of France in Morocco had been
weak and spasmodic; in his hands it became firm and consecutive. A
sympathetic understanding of the native prejudices, and a real affection
for the native character, made him try to build up an administration
which should be, not an application of French ideas to African
conditions, but a development of the best native aspirations. The
difficulties were immense. The attempt to govern as far as possible
through the Great Chiefs was a