n. Reflection, however, will make one thing evident, viz. that
though the public may share that part of the advantage derived from the
more economical use of large capitals, it cannot share that portion
which is derived from the absence of competition. If two or more Trusts
or aggregations of capital are still in actual or even in potential
competition, the public will be enabled to reap what gain belongs to
larger efficient production, for it will be for the interest of each
severally to sell at the lowest prices; but if a single Trust rule the
market, though the economic advantage of the Trust will be greater in so
far as it escapes the labour of all competition, there will be no force
to secure for the public any share in this advantage. The advantageous
position enjoyed by a Trust will certainly enable its owners at the same
time to pay high profits, give high wages, and sell at low prices. But
while the force of self-interest will secure the first result, there is
nothing to guarantee the second and third. There is no adequate security
that in the culminating product of capitalistic growth, the single
dominant Trust or Syndicate self-interest will keep down prices, as is
often urged by the advocates of Trust. It is true that "they have a
direct interest in keeping prices at least sufficiently low not to
invite the organization of counter-enterprises which may destroy their
existing profits."[39] But this consideration is qualified in two
ways:--_a_. Where Trust is formed or assisted by the possession of a
natural monopoly, i.e. land, or some content of land, absolutely limited
in quality, such potential competition does not exist, and nothing, save
the possibility of substituting another commodity, places a limit on the
rise of price which a Trust may impose on the public.. Although the fear
of potential competition will prevent the maintenance of an indefinitely
high price it will not necessarily prevent such a rise of price as will
yield enormous profits, and form a grievous burden on consumers. For a
strongly-constituted Trust will be able to crush any competing
combination of ordinary size and strength by a temporary lowering of its
prices below the margin of profitable production, the weapon which a
strong rich company can always use successfully against a weaker new
competitor.

But though a Trust with a really strong monopoly, and rid of all
effective competition, will be able to impose exorbitant and oppress