his limbs were
capable, he tottered back to the upper air.

Such was the state of the Court of Spain when, in the autumn of 1699, it
became known that, since the death of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria,
the governments of France, of England and of the United Provinces, were
busily engaged in framing a second Treaty of Partition. That Castilians
would be indignant at learning that any foreign potentate meditated the
dismemberment of that empire of which Castile was the head might have
been foreseen. But it was less easy to foresee that William would be
the chief and indeed almost the only object of their indignation. If the
meditated partition really was unjustifiable, there could be no doubt
that Lewis was far more to blame than William. For it was by Lewis, and
not by William, that the partition had been originally suggested; and it
was Lewis, and not William, who was to gain an accession of territory
by the partition. Nobody could doubt that William would most gladly
have acceded to any arrangement by which the Spanish monarchy, could be
preserved entire without danger to the liberties of Europe, and that he
had agreed to the division of that monarchy solely for the purpose of
contenting Lewis. Nevertheless the Spanish ministers carefully avoided
whatever could give offence to Lewis, and indemnified themselves by
offering a gross indignity to William. The truth is that their pride
had, as extravagant pride often has, a close affinity with meanness.
They knew that it was unsafe to insult Lewis; and they believed that
they might with perfect safety insult William. Lewis was absolute master
of his large kingdom. He had at no great distance armies and fleets
which one word from him would put in motion. If he were provoked,
the white flag might in a few days be again flying on the walls of
Barcelona. His immense power was contemplated by the Castilians with
hope as well as with fear. He and he alone, they imagined, could avert
that dismemberment of which they could not bear to think. Perhaps
he might yet be induced to violate the engagements into which he had
entered with England and Holland, if one of his grandsons were named
successor to the Spanish throne. He, therefore, must be respected and
courted. But William could at that moment do little to hurt or to help.
He could hardly be said to have an army. He could take no step which
would require an outlay of money without the sanction of the House of
Commons; and it see