undertook to unite with their employers in a
stoppage of work for such length of time as was requisite to force the
collapse of the "ring."

In the same year a formidable flour syndicate broke down before the
firm attitude of the co-operative flour mills.[127]

But though the speculative character of modern commerce, assisted by
the abundant use of credit, has lent special facilities to the
formation of "corners" and "rings," it is hardly necessary to say that
commerce has never been free from them. The celebrated "corner" in
grain which Joseph organised on behalf of the King of Egypt was one of
the largest and most successful. The commercial law of the Middle Ages
is full of provisions against engrossers, forestallers, and regrators,
all of whom were engaged in artificially raising prices to the
consumer by obtaining some sort of monopoly. Organised rings to secure
a monopoly of the food supply of some great city have been frequent
throughout history. Cicero informs us of the celebrated ring of
capitalists under Crassus to raise food prices at Rome. A
closely-formed combination of northern coalowners continued to
restrict output and impose monopoly prices upon London consumers for a
considerable time in the middle of the eighteenth century.[128]

In modern times these "corners" are essentially of brief duration so
far as they consist in narrowing the stream of commerce at a
particular point so as to check its free flow. Most of them are
confined to goods which are dealt with upon commercial exchanges, and
are amenable to the operations of skilled speculators. The "deal" must
be upon a scale large enough to enable a big net profit to be secured
in a short time. The stimulation which artificially inflated prices
apply to the early productive processes, the activity of other
speculators, and the check given to consumption by high prices,
generally preclude the possibility of a "corner" lasting long. The
strength of the copper "corner," had it succeeded, would have lain in
the hold it would have obtained over the early extractive stage,
preventing the operation of the natural stimulus of high prices to
increase production. If the Copper Syndicate had established its hold
upon the mining companies, it would have been able to hold the market
for an indefinite period, passing from the state of a "corner" into
the more durable and established position of the Trust.

Sec. 8. A Trust may be regarded from an economic aspect,