uted by a brisk fire from the
wooded hill-sides. Santocildes fell dead, and a bullet tore the heel from
the governor-general's boot.

Maceo, surmising from the confusion in the Spanish ranks that some
important officer had fallen, now launched his horsemen upon them in a
vigorous machete charge. Though Campos succeeded in repelling them, he
felt himself in a critical situation, and hastily drew up his whole force
into a hollow square, with the wagons and the dead horses and mules for
breastworks. Around this strong formation the Cubans raged for several
hours, only the skill of Campos saving his men from a disastrous rout. An
assault was made on the rear guard early in the affray, Maceo hoping to
capture the ammunition train. But its defenders held their ground
vigorously, and fought their way to the main column, where they aided to
form the square. Finally the Spaniards succeeded in reaching Bayamo,
pursued by the Cubans and having lost heavily in the fight. They were
saved from utter destruction by Maceo's lack of artillery, and Campos was
very careful afterwards not to venture near this daring leader without a
powerful force.

Maximo Gomez, one of the principal leaders in the earlier war, had now
been appointed commander-in-chief of the Cuban forces, with Antonio Maceo
as his lieutenant-general. He had made his way westward into the province
of Santa Clara, and in November Maceo left the eastern province of
Santiago de Cuba to join him. In his way lay the trocha, the famous device
of the Spaniards to prevent the free movement of the Cuban forces. It may
be of interest to describe this new idea in warfare, devised by the
Spaniards to check the free movement of their rebel foes.

The word trocha means trench, but the Spanish trochas were military lines
cut through the woods and across the island from side to side, and
defended by barbed-wire fences, while the felled trees were piled along
both sides of the roadway, making a difficult breastwork of jagged roots
and branches. At intervals of a quarter-mile or more along this
well-guarded avenue were forts, each with a garrison of about one hundred
men, it needing about fifteen thousand to defend the whole line of the
trocha from sea to sea.

Such was the elaborate device adopted by Campos, and by Weyler after him,
to check the Cuban movements. We need only say here that, despite its cost
and the number of men it tied up on guard duty, the trocha failed to
restrain th