difficult;
because if you go about to express what belongs to these separate
Essences, by way of Multitude, or in the _Plural_, according to our way
of speaking, this insinuates a Notion of _Multiplicity_, whereas they
are far from being _many_; and if you speak of them by way of
Separation, or in the Singular, this insinuates a Notion of Unity,
whereas they are far from being _one_.

Sec. 88. And here methinks I fee one of those Batts, whose Eyes the Sun
dazzles, moving himself in the Chain of his Folly, and saying, _This
Subtilty of yours exceeds all Bounds, for you have withdrawn your self
from the State and Condition of understanding Men, and indeed thrown
away the Nature of Intelligible Things, for this is a certain Axiom,
that a thing must be either one, or more than one_. Soft and fair; let
that Gentleman be pleas'd to consider with himself, and contemplate this
vile, sensible World, after the same manner which _Hai Ebn Yokdhan_ did,
who, when he consider'd it one way, sound such a Multiplicity in it, as
was incomprehensible; and then again considering it another way,
perceiv'd that it was only one thing; and thus he continu'd fluctuating,
and could not determine on one side more than another. Now if it were so
in this sensible World, which is the proper place of _Multiplicity_ and
_Singularity_, and the place where the true Nature of them is
understood, and in which are _Separation_ and _Union, Division_ into
Parts, and _Distinction, Agreement_ and _Difference_, what would he
think of the Divine World, in, or concerning which we cannot justly say,
_all_ nor _some_, nor express any thing belonging to it by such Words as
our Ears are us'd to, without insinuating some Notion which is contrary
to the Truth of the thing, which no Man knows but he that has seen it,
nor understands; but he that has attain'd to it.

Sec. 89. And as for his saying, _That I have withdrawn myself from the
State and Condition of understanding Men, and thrown away the Nature of
Intelligible Things_: I grant it, and leave him to his Understanding,
and his understanding Men he speaks of. For that Understanding which he,
and such as he, mean, is nothing else but that Rational Faculty which
examines the Individuals of Sensible Things, and from thence gets an
Universal Notion; and those understanding Men he means, are those which
make use of this sort of Separation. But that kind, which we are now
speaking of, is above all this; and therefore le