he power exercised in
conducting them is distinguished by almost imperceptible shades from the
legislative, and that all such as admit of open discussion and of the
delay attendant on public deliberations are properly the province of the
representative assembly. If this observation be duly attended to, it
will appear that this part of the executive power will be extremely
circumscribed, will be stripped almost entirely of a deliberative
capacity, and will be reduced to a mere hand or instrument. As a
Republican government would leave this power to a select body destitute
of the means of corruption, and whom the people, continually
contributing, could at all times bring to account or dismiss, will it
not necessarily ensue that a body so selected and supported would
perform their simple functions with greater efficacy and fidelity than
the complicated concerns of royalty can be expected to meet with in the
councils of princes; of men who from their wealth and interest have
forced themselves into trust; and of statesmen, whose constant object is
to exalt themselves by laying pitfalls for their colleagues and for
their country.

I shall pursue this subject no further; but adopting your Lordship's
method of argument, instead of continuing to demonstrate the superiority
of a Republican executive government, I will repeat some of the
objections which have been often made to monarchy, and have not been
answered.

My first objection to regal government is its instability, proceeding
from a variety of causes. Where monarchy is found in its greatest
intensity, as in Morocco and Turkey, this observation is illustrated in
a very pointed manner, and indeed is more or less striking as
governments are more or less despotic. The reason is obvious: as the
monarch is the chooser of his ministers, and as his own passions and
caprice are in general the sole guides of his conduct, these ministers,
instead of pursuing directly the one grand object of national welfare,
will make it their chief study to vary their measures according to his
humours. But a minister _may_ be refractory: his successor will
naturally run headlong into plans totally the reverse of the former
system; for if he treads in the same path, he is well aware that a
similar fate will attend him. This observation will apply to each
succession of kings, who, from vanity and a desire of distinction, will
in general studiously avoid any step which may lead to a suspicion that