ter the engagement had lasted an hour and a half we noticed that the
enemy began to waver, and was planning a retreat. To their dismay
General Grobler now made his appearance with reinforcements. He had
encamped that night some nine miles from Stormberg, and on hearing the
report of the guns, returned with Commandant du Plooy of Bethulie to
assist the Stormberg defenders.
On his arrival the enemy, exposed to a cross-fire, ran the risk of being
surrounded and captured. There was but one way out of a wretched
position--one loophole out of the net. Fortunately for them, Commandant
Zwanepoel of Smithfield, who had just given orders to guard this way of
escape, was badly wounded while rising to lead on his men. Owing to this
mishap his burghers failed to carry out his instructions, thus leaving
the way open.
Gatacre, seeing that it was a hopeless struggle, abandoned the project
of reoccupying Stormberg and sounded the retreat. He was followed up for
some distance by Commandant du Plooy, who made a few prisoners and took
two ammunition waggons. Weary and thirsty, the English forces re-entered
Molteno that evening. They had been baffled in a determined attack.
Their losses amounted to about 700, captured, wounded and killed. Those
who had taken shelter behind the rocks and in the donga were all made
prisoners. They remained there till the rest had retreated, and then
hoisted the white flag. One English writer says that they were
shamefully forgotten by General Gatacre, who was thus responsible for
their loss. Indeed a questionable explanation! Among the wounded were a
few officers and some privates, who were seriously injured by their own
guns as they tried to seize the Boer positions. Colonel Eagar, one of
the wounded, was removed to our hospital, where he breathed his last. In
addition to the number of prisoners we also captured two big guns. Our
losses amounted to 6 killed and 27 wounded.
The attack on the Stormberg positions, if it was boldly conceived, was
badly carried out. The English general should have postponed the attack
when it dawned upon him that he would not reach the enemy's positions
before daybreak; and he should have used the knowledge, common to most
soldiers, that it is best to attack a foe's weakest side. This was not
done at Stormberg. We, too, suffered from ill-advised action--or rather,
inaction. For we had had the opportunity of capturing, if not all, most
of Gatacre's men, with all their guns, a
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