oincides with his contrary
list characterising 'the tough-minded':--

'Empiricist (going by "facts")
Sensationalistic
Materialistic
Pessimistic
Irreligious
Fatalistic
Pluralistic
Skeptical'

--though here again the item 'pluralistic' does not chime with the
common conception, and 'pessimistic' is hardly less open to challenge.
'Intellectualistic' appears to be aimed at Hegelians, but would be
understood by many as describing the tendency to set up 'reason' against
'authority'; and Professor James's 'rationalists,' who would appear to
include thinkers like his colleague Professor Royce, would not be so
described in England by many university men, clergymen, or journalists.
The name 'rationalist,' in short, has come to mean for most people in
this country very much what 'freethinker' used to mean for those who did
not employ it as a mere term of abuse. It stands, that is to say, for
one who rejects the claims of 'revelation,' the idea of a personal God,
the belief in personal immortality, and in general the conceptions
logically accruing to the practices of prayer and worship.

Perhaps the best name for such persons would be 'naturalist,' which was
already in use with some such force in the time of Bodin and Montaigne.
Kant, it may be remembered, distinguished between 'rationalists,' as
thinkers who did not deny the possibility of a revelation, and
'naturalists' who did. But though 'natural_ism_,' has latterly been
recognised by many as a highly convenient term for the view of things
which rejects 'supernaturalism,' and will be so used in the present
discussion, the correlative 'natural_ist_' has never, so to speak, been
naturalised in English. For one thing, it has been specialised in
ordinary language in the sense of 'student of nature,' or rather of what
has come to be specially known as 'natural history'--in particular, the
life of birds, insects, fishes, and animals. And, further, the term
'naturalism,' like every other general label for a way of thinking, is
liable to divagations and misunderstandings. Some thinkers (known to the
present writer only through the accounts given of them by others) appear
to formulate as a philosophic principle the doctrine that the best way
to regulate our lives is to find out how the broad processes of 'Nature'
is tending, and to conform to it alike our ideals and our practice. The
notion is that if, say, Nature appears to be making f