ing in
England may serve to show what a wealth of private enterprise lay ready
to the hand of the Government when the building of the air force began.
The Royal Air Force, like the tree of the Gospel parable, grew from a
small seed, but it was nourished in a rich soil. The great experiment
of flying attracted a multitude of adventurous minds, and prepared
recruits for the nation long before the nation asked for them. This
early predominance of private enterprise, it is worth remarking, told in
favour of military rather than naval flying, and, when the Flying Corps
was formed, started the Military Wing at an advantage. Little has been
said as yet, because in truth there is little to say, of pioneer work in
the air done by sailors. Yet no one would dare to assert that the
average sailor is less resourceful, less inventive, less open to new
ideas, than the average soldier. No doubt there were many senior
officers in the navy, as there were many in the army, who in the early
days regarded aviation with professional impatience and scorn. Further,
the higher command of the navy were not quick, when aircraft became
practically efficient, to divine or devise a use for them. The
difficulty of employing them over the sea was formidable, and none of
their uses was quite so obvious as their use (questioned by more than
one distinguished army general) for reconnaissance in a land campaign.
But the real difference which told in favour of military aviation lay in
the nature of the services. A sailor is attached to his ship, and flying
is an art which of necessity must be practised and developed, in its
beginnings, over wide level tracts of land. The value of the airship for
distant reconnaissance at sea is now fully recognized, but airship
building is not a possible hobby for a young naval officer. Those naval
officers who believed in the future of the new weapon were reduced to
attempting to influence the Government, so that it might undertake the
necessary work. While the army officer could attend aviation meetings
and demonstrate his opinions in practice, his less fortunate brother in
the navy had no resource but to engage in a melancholy course of
politics, with small prospects of public result, and smaller prospects
of private advancement.

The consequence of all this is that the history of the work done by the
navy with aeroplanes and airships is essentially a history of official
decisions and official acts. Great credit must be