tions of grave importance, with a levity of conviction
upon which he would not act in the most trivial affairs of private life.
No doctor would prescribe for the slightest malady; no lawyer would
advise in the easiest case; no wise man would act in the simplest
transactions of private business, or would even give an opinion to his
neighbour at a dinner party without more knowledge of the subject than
that on which a member of Parliament is often obliged to vote. But he
soon finds that for good or evil this system is absolutely indispensable
to the working of the machine. If no one voted except on matters he
really understood and cared for, four-fifths of the questions that are
determined by the House of Commons would be determined by mere fractions
of its members, and in that case parliamentary government under the
party system would be impossible. The stable, disciplined majorities
without which it can never be efficiently conducted would be at an end.
Those who refuse to accept the conditions of parliamentary life should
abstain from entering into it.

It is obvious that the one justification of this system is to be found
in the belief that parliamentary government, as it is worked in England,
is on the whole a good thing, and that this is the indispensable
condition of its existence. Probably also with most men it strengthens
the disposition to support the Government on matters which they do not
understand and in which grave party issues are not involved. They know
that these minor questions have at least been carefully examined on
their merits by responsible men, and with the assistance of the best
available expert knowledge.

This fact goes far to reconcile us to the tendency to give governments
an almost complete monopoly in the initiation of legislation which is so
evident in modern parliamentary life. Much useful legislation in the
past has been due to private and independent members, but the chance of
bills introduced by such members ever becoming law is steadily
diminishing. This is not due to any recognised constitutional change,
but to the constantly increasing pressure of government business on the
time of the House, and especially to what is called the twelve o'clock
rule, terminating debates at midnight.

It is a rule which is manifestly wise, for it limits on ordinary
occasions the hours of parliamentary work to a period within the
strength of an average man. Parliamentary government has many dubious