on which may attempt either to join the Spanish
ships at Cadiz, or to pass through the Straits; and to use your
best endeavours to intercept, and to take or destroy it, if the
force you may have with you should be sufficient to enable you
to do so; taking care to avoid it in time, if the enemy's force
should be so superior to that under your command as to render it
improper for you to attack it; in which case it is left to your
discretion to act as circumstances shall require: using,
however, every possible exertion to join the commander-in-chief
of his Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean, or to fall in with
the same detachment of his Majesty's ships; and, so soon as you
shall have collected such a force as may be sufficient to enable
you to attack the enemy's squadron, you are to proceed in quest
of it, and, upon falling in with it, to bring it to action.

In case you should get sight of a French squadron, or should
obtain certain information that such squadron has passed the
Straits, you are no longer to attend to the Spanish ships in
Cadiz, but to consider the capture or destruction of the French
squadron as the principal object to which your exertions are to
be directed; and, in the event of your following any squadron
into the Mediterranean, you are to send an account thereof to
our secretary, as well as to Admiral Lord Keith, with as little
delay as possible; and you are also to transmit to him and the
said admiral, by every proper opportunity that may offer,
accounts of your proceedings, and of every information you may
be able to obtain of the movements and intentions of the enemy.

Given under our hands, 6th day of June 1801.
ST. VINCENT.
T. TROUBRIDGE.
J. MARKHAM.

To Sir James Saumarez, Bart.
Rear-admiral of the Blue,
Plymouth.
By command of their Lordships,
EVAN NEPEAN.

The following is the copy of information transmitted to Sir James with
the above letter:

No. 1.

Dated Lisbon, 15th May 1801.

MY LORD,

It appears, from the report of an American captain arrived here
from Bilboa, that a French corps had passed within a few miles
of that place, on their way to Vittoria, on the 21st and 22nd
ultimo. It consisted in the whole of 7,000 infantry and 2,000
cavalry, well armed and mounted; and had reached their place of
encampment, supposed to be Burgos, according to th