midable display of
artillery; and, shielded in its rear by the heavily armed fort of Saint
Quentin, might well-nigh be considered impregnable. Bazaine's centre,
although not so strongly placed, had also the advantage of rising
ground; and, the right of the line was equally protected by natural and
artificial means. Along this admirably selected fighting ground the
French Marshal posted some hundred thousand men altogether, clinging to
Gravelotte with his best troops, and leaving about twenty thousand as a
reserve near Metz--thus acting entirely on the defensive.

While Bazaine had been making these preparations, the German leaders had
not by any means been idle. On the same day that the French Marshal was
entrenching himself on his chosen field of battle, the entire force of
the second army, under the Red Prince, approaching from Pont-a-Mousson,
had come into line; and, in communication with the first army, under old
"Blood and Iron" Steinmetz, had completely crossed the French, line of
retreat, occupying the Verdun and Etain roads northward from Rezonville
to Doncourt, with the remaining corps that had remained to the east of
Metz supporting the rear and right flank. Altogether, the German
commanders had at least nine army corps in hand; and when the
reinforcements were brought up, they could calculate on possessing a
force of no less than two hundred and forty thousand men to hurl against
their antagonists, thus overmatched at the very outset by at least two
to one.

The Teuton plan of battle, as subsequently detailed, premised, that, as
the French left at Gravelotte was prodigiously strong, making it
extremely difficult to carry that position without enormous sacrifices,
it would be preferable to move a large part of the army across Bazaine's
front, in order to assail and crush his right wing, which was protected
in the rear by Metz, and so could not be turned in that direction. It
was also decided that, at the same time, a forward attack should be made
as a feint on Gravelotte, the German commanders hoping that under the
double pressure of a simultaneous onslaught on both its wings, the
French army would lose its hold of the Verdun and Etain roads--which of
course it was Bazaine's object to secure--when, being driven in under
the guns of Metz, his forces would there be isolated and completely cut
off from any further action in the campaign.

This result, it may be here stated, was ultimately attained, althoug