the one farther to
the north; while the other, who was on the south bank of the Tagus
with a number of Portuguese militia and irregulars, endeavoured to
prevent the French from crossing the river and carrying off the
flocks, herds, and corn which, in spite of Wellington's entreaties
and orders, the Portuguese government had permitted to remain, as
if in handiness for the French foraging parties.

Owing to the exhausted state of both the British and Portuguese
treasuries, it was impossible to supply the corps acting in rear of
the French with money for the purchase of food. But Terence had
received authority to take what provisions were absolutely
necessary for the troops, and to give orders that would, at some
time or other, be honoured by the military chest. A comparatively
small proportion of his men were needed to guard the defiles,
against such bodies of troops as would be likely to traverse them,
in order to keep up Massena's communications. Leaving, therefore, a
hundred men in each of the principal defiles; and ordering them to
entrench themselves in places where they commanded the road, and
could only be attacked with the greatest difficulty; while the road
was barred by trees felled across it, so as to form an impassable
abattis, behind which twenty men were stationed; Terence marched,
with 1500 men, towards the frontier.

Five hundred of these were placed along the Coa, guarding the roads
and, with the remainder, he forded the river and placed himself in
the woods, in the plain between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. Here he
captured several convoys of waggons, proceeding with provisions for
the garrison of the former place. A portion of these he despatched,
under guard, for the use of the troops on the Coa, and for those in
the passes; thus rendering it unnecessary to harass the people, who
had returned to their villages after Massena had advanced against
Lisbon.

Growing bolder with success, he crossed the Aqueda and, marching
round to the rear of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off and destroyed convoys
intended for that town, causing great alarm to the garrison. These
were absolutely ignorant of the operations of Massena, for so
active were the partisans, in the French rear, that no single
messenger succeeded in getting through and, even when accompanied
by strong escorts, the opposition encountered was so determined
that the French were obliged to fall back, without having
accomplished their purpose. Thus, then, the