a lie for charity, to save a
man's life, the life of a friend, of a husband, of a prince, of a
useful and a public person, hath not only been done at all times, but
commended by great and wise and good men.... Who would not save his
father's life ... at the charge of a _harmless lie_, from the rage of
persecutors or tyrants? ...When the telling of a truth will certainly
be the cause of evil to a man, though he have right to truth, yet it
must not be given to him to his harm.... _Every_ truth is no more
_justice_, than every restitution of a straw to the right owner is a
duty. 'Be not over-righteous,' says Solomon.... If it be objected,
that we must not tell a lie for God, therefore much less for our
brother, I answer, that it does not follow; for God needs not a lie,
_but our brother does_.... _Deceiving_ the enemy by the stratagem of
actions or _words_, is _not properly lying_; for this supposes a
conversation, of law or peace, trust or _promise_ explicit or
implicit. A lie is a deceiving of a _trust or confidence_."--Taylor,
vol. xiii. pp. 351-371, ed. Heber.

It is clear that Taylor thought that veracity was one branch of
justice; a social virtue; under the second table of the law, not
under the first; only binding, when those to whom we speak have a
claim of justice upon us, which ordinarily all men have. Accordingly,
in cases where a neighbour has no claim of justice upon us, there is
no opportunity of exercising veracity, as, for instance, when he is
mad, or is deceived by us for his own advantage. And hence, in such
cases, a lie is _not really_ a lie, as he says in one place,
"Deceiving the enemy is _not properly_ lying." Here he seems to make
that distinction common to Catholics; viz. between what they call a
_material_ act and a _formal_ act. Thus Taylor would maintain, that
to say the thing that is not to a madman, has the _matter_ of a lie,
but the man who says it as little tells a formal lie, as the judge,
sheriff, or executioner murders the man whom he certainly kills by
forms of law.

Other English authors take precisely the same view, viz. that
veracity is a kind of justice--that our neighbour generally has a
_right_ to have the truth told him; but that he may forfeit that
right, or lose it for the time, and then to say the thing that is not
to him is no sin against veracity, that is, no lie. Thus Milton says,
"Veracity is a virtue, by which we speak true things to him _to whom
it_ is equitable, and co