tion, _than_ that developments
do _not_ exist under the Gospel, and that the Roman developments are
not the true ones. 2. I am far more certain, that _our_ (modern)
doctrines are wrong, _than_ that the _Roman_ (modern) doctrines are
wrong. 3. Granting that the Roman (special) doctrines are not found
drawn out in the early Church, yet I think there is sufficient trace
of them in it, to recommend and prove them, _on the hypothesis_ of
the Church having a divine guidance, though not sufficient to prove
them by itself. So that the question simply turns on the nature of
the promise of the Spirit, made to the Church. 4. The proof of the
Roman (modern) doctrine is as strong (or stronger) in Antiquity, as
that of certain doctrines which both we and Romans hold: _e.g._ there
is more of evidence in Antiquity for the necessity of Unity, than for
the Apostolical Succession; for the Supremacy of the See of Rome,
than for the Presence in the Eucharist; for the practice of
Invocation, than for certain books in the present Canon of Scripture,
etc., etc. 5. The analogy of the Old Testament, and also of the New,
leads to the acknowledgment of doctrinal developments."

And thus I was led on to a further consideration. I saw that the
principle of development not only accounted for certain facts,
but was in itself a remarkable philosophical phenomenon, giving
a character to the whole course of Christian thought. It was
discernible from the first years of the Catholic teaching up to the
present day, and gave to that teaching a unity and individuality.
It served as a sort of test, which the Anglican could not exhibit,
that modern Rome was in truth ancient Antioch, Alexandria, and
Constantinople, just as a mathematical curve has its own law and
expression.

And thus again I was led on to examine more attentively what I doubt
not was in my thoughts long before, viz. the concatenation of
argument by which the mind ascends from its first to its final
religious idea; and I came to the conclusion that there was no
medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and Catholicity, and that
a perfectly consistent mind, under those circumstances in which it
finds itself here below, must embrace either the one or the other.
And I hold this still: I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in a
God; and if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is
because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in
my own existence (and of that