come the seat of war; and that most important military
operations would be carried on in that colony. The fortifications
which had been commenced for the defence of its capital were
indefatigably prosecuted; and, after the arrival of General
Washington, these works, combined with those to be erected in the
passes through the highlands up the Hudson, were the objects of his
unremitting attention.

The difficulty which had been experienced in expelling the British
from Boston, had demonstrated the importance of preventing their
establishment in New York; and had contributed to the determination of
contesting with them, very seriously, the possession of that important
place. The execution of this determination, however, was difficult and
dangerous. The defence of New York, against an enemy commanding the
sea, requires an army capable of meeting him in the open field, and of
acting offensively both on Long and York Islands. Congress had not
adopted measures which might raise such an army. The
Commander-in-chief, in his letters to that body, had long and
earnestly urged the policy of bringing the whole strength of the
country into regular operation. The government was not inattentive to
his remonstrances; but many circumstances combined to prevent such a
military establishment as the exigency required.

The congress which assembled in 1775 had adjourned with strong hopes
that the differences between the Mother Country and the Colonies would
soon be adjusted to their mutual satisfaction. When the temper
manifested both by the king and his parliament had dissipated these
hopes, and the immense preparations of Great Britain for war, evinced
the necessity of preparations equally vigorous on the part of America,
the resolution to make them was finally taken. But, unaccustomed to
the great duties of conducting a war of vast extent, they could not
estimate rightly the value of the means employed, nor calculate the
effects which certain causes would produce. Opinions of the most
pernicious tendency prevailed; from which they receded slowly, and
from which they could be ultimately forced only by melancholy
experience.

The most fatal among these was the theory, that an army could be
created every campaign for the purposes of that campaign; and that
such temporary means would be adequate to the defence of the country.
They relied confidently on being able on any emergency, to call out a
force suited to the occasion:--they relied t