ed themselves that their
long-deferred hopes may at length gain fulfilment. Nor ought we to forget
that splendid act of reform which has abolished the Imperial monopoly of
the sale of vodka. If by one stroke of the pen the Tsar can sacrifice
ninety-three millions of revenue in order that Russia may be sober, it is
not very extravagant to hope that in virtue of the same kind of benevolent
despotism Russia may secure a liberal constitution and the Russian people
be set free.[11]

[11] See _Our Russian Ally_, by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace (Macmillan).

MILITARY AUTOCRACY

The end of a great war, however, has one inevitable result, that it leaves
a military autocracy in supreme control of affairs. The armies which have
won the various campaigns, the generals who have led them, the
Commanders-in-Chief who have carried out the successful strategy, these
are naturally left with almost complete authority in their hands.
Wellington, for instance, a hundred years ago, held an extraordinarily
strong position in deciding the fate of Europe. And so, too, did the
Russian Tsar, whose armies had done so much to destroy the legend of
Napoleonic invincibility. Similar conditions must be expected on the
present occasion. And, perhaps, the real use of diplomats, if they are
prudent and level-headed men, is to control the ambitions of the military
element, to adopt a wider outlook, to consider the ultimate consequences
rather than the immediate effects of things. It would indeed be a
lamentable result if a war which was intended to destroy militarism in
Europe should end by setting up militarism in high places.

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

Thus we seem to see still more clearly than before that the size of
armaments in Europe constitutes a fundamental problem with which we have
to grapple. Every soldier, as a matter of course, believes in military
armaments, and is inclined to exaggerate their social and not merely their
offensive value. Those of us who are not soldiers, but who are interested
in the social and economic development of the nation, know, on the
contrary, that the most destructive and wasteful form of expenditure is
that which is occupied with armaments grown so bloated that they go far to
render the most pressing domestic reforms absolutely impossible. How,
then, can we limit the size of armaments? What provision can we make to
keep in check that desire to fortify itself, to entrench itself in an
absolutely commanding