d, like the
history of Asia, have become a mere record of the rise and fall of
despotic dynasties, of the incursions of barbarous hordes, and of the
mental and political prostration of millions beneath the diadem, the
tiara, and the sword.

Great as the preponderance of the Persian over the Athenian power at
that crisis seems to have been, it would be unjust to impute wild
rashness to the policy of Miltiades and those who voted with him in the
Athenian council of war, or to look on the after-current of events as
the mere fortunate result of successful folly. As before has been
remarked, Miltiades, while prince of the Chersonese, had seen service in
the Persian armies; and he knew by personal observation how many
elements of weakness lurked beneath their imposing aspect of strength.
He knew that the bulk of their troops no longer consisted of the hardy
shepherds and mountaineers from Persia proper and Kurdistan, who won
Cyrus's battles; but that unwilling contingents from conquered nations
now filled up the Persian muster-rolls, fighting more from compulsion
than from any zeal in the cause of their masters. He had also the
sagacity and the spirit to appreciate the superiority of the Greek armor
and organization over the Asiatic, notwithstanding former reverses.
Above all, he felt and worthily trusted the enthusiasm of those whom he
led.

The Athenians whom he led had proved by their newborn valor in recent
wars against the neighboring states that "liberty and equality of civic
rights are brave spirit-stirring things, and they, who, while under the
yoke of a despot, had been no better men of war than any of their
neighbors, as soon as they were free, became the foremost men of all;
for each felt that in fighting for a free commonwealth, he fought for
himself, and whatever he took in hand, he was zealous to do the work
thoroughly," So the nearly contemporaneous historian describes the
change of spirit that was seen in the Athenians after their tyrants were
expelled; and Miltiades knew that in leading them against the invading
army, where they had Hippias, the foe they most hated, before them, he
was bringing into battle no ordinary men, and could calculate on no
ordinary heroism.

As for traitors, he was sure that, whatever treachery might lurk among
some of the higher born and wealthier Athenians, the rank and file whom
he commanded were ready to do their utmost in his and their own cause.
With regard to future attack