urged his crucifixion, for fear "all men would believe on
him." The latter was prevailed with to condemn the guiltless, because
he wished to gratify the chiefs of the nation which he governed. Both
sinned against the light of their own minds, not of necessity, but out
of choice--knowingly did wrong to gain worldly ends; or avoid temporal
disadvantages.

Sinners commonly act on the same principles. They can distinguish
between good an evil--can "judge of themselves what is right." They
know it to be their duty to choose the good, and refuse the evil. But
possessing power to counteract the dictates of conscience, often to
gain worldly ends, and answer sinister views, do counteract them
--choose that for which they are condemned of themselves.

It is folly to pretend that our choices are necessary. The proposition
involves absurdity. Choice and necessity are often opposites.

Some bewildered in the labyrinth of metaphysics have doubted the
plainest truths--the existence of matter! And even their own
existence! But these doubts are a species of madness. To the person of
common sense they are unnecessary. Let him only believe his senses,
which the author of nature hath given to instruct him, and they will
all vanish.

In the case before us, a single glance inward, carries full conviction
that we are free. To offer arguments in proof is superfluous--is
trifling--it is to ape the philosopher who attempted to syllogize
himself into a conviction of his own existence! *

* Cogito, ergo sum. Descartes.

From the knowledge of our capacity, and liberty of choice, ariseth
sense of merit and demerit. And thence our expectation of reward or
punishment from an enlightened and righteous tribunal. Were we
necessitated to actions, now, the most criminal, we should have no
sense of guilt; neither should we fear condemnation from a just judge
on their account. Did we choose such actions, if we knew our choices
to be the effect of invincible, supernal influence, they would give us
no concern. On our part, no criminality would be attached to them; it
would rest with the efficient. Had Pilate been compelled to give
sentence against Christ, he would have had no sense of guilt; nor
could he have been justly criminated. But when the motives which
actuated him, and his freedom of choice are considered, he must have
been condemned of himself, and of all mankind.

When Pilate appealed to our Lord, that he was possessed of power,
either _to