duction would be eminently absurd as well as pernicious. And if
they be different, as essentially they are, there must be some strong
justification for the adoption of the latter.

But before proceeding to this enquiry, it may not be amiss to point out
the exact distinction between the original and the new resolution. The
former embraced a rule of action whereby the members of the Association
engaged their faith and honour to each other and the country that they
would not use its agency to cause or promote physical force or violence
of any kind, or commit one another to any act of illegality. But it went
no farther--it enunciated no moral dogma--a rule of conscience rather
than a pledge of conduct such as the other--and it claimed no sacrifice
of one's own convictions. As a mutual guarantee, it was not only just
but essential to the perfect safety of the Association.

On the other hand, the new resolution excluded the question of practical
action altogether. Neither in itself nor in its preamble was there an
averment, or even an assumption of its necessity, as a rule of guidance.
It was a mere abstract opinion, utterly irrespective of the object or
conduct of the Association, and only applicable as a test of certain
speculative theories. But not alone was it inapplicable and
preposterous; it was utterly untrue: at least, there are many men who
could not subscribe to it without, according to their own convictions,
being guilty of a lie. Supposing, however, that the seceders had
attempted to violate the old constitution of the confederacy, it may be
argued that Mr. O'Connell would be justified in preparing the most
stringent tests for the purpose of restraining them. But no such attempt
was ever made; no one proposed in the Association, no one hinted outside
it, that it ought to violate one of its rules. No one complained of
these rules, or said they ought to be changed, modified or, to the least
extent, relaxed. Neither directly nor indirectly, openly nor covertly,
was there a word spoken, nor an act done, nor a suggestion offered to
that effect. The resolution was, therefore, uncalled for and
unnecessary, as it was unsound and untrue.

Of this there is the clearest proof. First, the negative proof is
conclusive. Mr. O'Connell did not name an act, or refer to a word of one
single seceder, which would justify the imputation that they sought or
desired to involve the Association in any expedient inconsistent with
its fun