been found, were in a position to furnish any amount of
accurate and trustworthy information with regard to climate, topography,
roads, rains, surf, and local conditions generally, in the very field
that General Shafter's army was to occupy.

The sources of information above indicated were not the only sources
accessible at the time when the Santiago campaign was decided upon; but
they were the most important ones, and it is fair to presume that
General Shafter made use of them to the fullest possible extent. If so,
he was able to answer the questions above suggested in some such way as
this:

1. The field to which I am going is a tropical field, and the unusual
and unfamiliar difficulties with which I shall have to contend are
probably those dependent upon climatic conditions.

2. There are no sheltered harbors on the southeastern coast of Cuba
between Cape Cruz and Cape Maysi except the harbor of Santiago and the
Bay of Guantanamo. The former is in possession of the enemy, and cannot,
therefore, be used, while the latter is too far away from the city of
Santiago, which I am ordered to capture. It is probable, therefore, that
I shall have to land my army on an unsheltered part of the coast. The
prevailing winds in the summer are from the east and southeast, and the
swell that rolls in from the Caribbean Sea often breaks on the exposed
coast-line in heavy and dangerous surf.

3. The roads leading back into the interior in the direction of Santiago
are generally narrow and bad; they traverse almost impenetrable
jungles; and they are liable, at this season of the year, to be rendered
impassable for wheeled vehicles by heavy and frequent rains.

4. The climate is unhealthful, and unless men from the North are well
fed, suitably clothed, securely sheltered, and furnished with boiled
water for drinking purposes, they are almost certain to suffer from
calenture, the characteristic fever of the region, as well as from
yellow fever and dysentery.

This, in the briefest possible summary, is the information that General
Shafter had, or might have had, before he sailed from Tampa. What
preparation did he make to meet the difficulties suggested by this
knowledge, and how far is the influence of it to be traced in the
organization and equipment of his command?

Take, first, the problem of disembarking an army of sixteen thousand
men, with the supplies necessary for its maintenance, on an unsheltered
coast.

In 1847, when