Castle they could watch and report all our
movements along the coast, and a march of three or four hours would
bring the army on the Siboney road back to the city, in ample time to
meet an attacking column from either Aguadores or Cabanas.

The second reason is that, for lack of adequate means of transportation,
they were unable to keep a large force supplied with food and ammunition
at a distance from its base. I doubt whether this reason has any greater
force than the other. I saw a large number of native horses and mules in
Santiago after the surrender, and as the distance from the city to the
strong positions on the Siboney road is only six or eight miles, it
would not have required extraordinary transportation facilities to carry
thither food and ammunition for three or four thousand men. But even
half that number, if they fought as the San Luis brigade afterward
fought at Caney, might have held General Shafter's advance in check for
days, and made the capture of Santiago a much more serious and costly
business than it was.

The truth probably is that General Linares was intimidated by the great
show made by our fleet and transports--sixty steam-vessels in all; that
he credited us with a much larger army than we really had; and that it
seemed to him better to make the decisive fight at once on the
commanding hills just east of Santiago than to lose perhaps one third of
his small available force in the woods on the Siboney road, and then be
driven back to the city at last with wearied and discouraged troops. But
it was a mistaken calculation. If he had delayed General Shafter's
column, by obstinately resisting its advance through the woods on the
Siboney road, he would have given Colonel Escarrio time enough to reach
Santiago with the reinforcements from Manzanillo before the decisive
battle, and would also have given the climate and the Cuban fever more
time to sap the strength and depress the spirits of our badly equipped
and improperly fed troops. The final struggle on the hills east of the
city might then have had a very different termination.

The policy that General Linares should have adopted was the Fabian
policy of obstruction, harassment, and delay. Every hour that he could
detain General Shafter's advancing army on the Siboney road increased
his own chances of success and lessened those of his adversary; because
the army of defense, already acclimated, could stand exposure to sun,
rain, and miasma much