r effectives may easily be grasped.

The second of these two general qualifications with which we must credit
Mr. Belloc is the fact of his envisagement of the possibility of this
war. Europe, Mr. Belloc argues, reposes upon the foundations of
nationality. Internationalism, whether it be expressed in the financial
rings of Capitalism or the world-wide brotherhoods of Socialism, is only
made possible by a harmony of the wills of the great European nations.
Should a conflict of wills not merely exist but break out into
expression in war, internationalism, though outwardly so powerful, must
inevitably go by the board and the ancient foundations upon which
Europe rests stand poignantly revealed. Such a conflict of wills Mr.
Belloc has always seen to exist between Prussia and the rest of the
nations of Europe. His knowledge of their history and character led him
years ago to that idea of the Prussians which this war has shown to be
the true idea, and which we find expressed on every hand to-day with
remarkable sageness after the event. This view is that which recognizes
fully that the Prussian spirit, "the soul of Prussia in her
international relations," is expressed in what is called the
"Frederician Tradition," which Mr. Belloc has put into the following
terms:

The King of Prussia shall do all that may seem to advantage the
kingdom of Prussia among the nations, notwithstanding any European
conventions or any traditions of Christendom, or even any of those
wider and more general conventions which govern the international
conduct of other Christian peoples.

Mr. Belloc further explains this tradition by saying:

For instance, if a convention of international morals has
arisen--as it did arise very strongly, and was kept until recent
times--that hostilities should not begin without a formal
declaration of war, the "Frederician Tradition" would go counter to
this, and would say: "If ultimately it would be to the advantage of
Prussia to attack without declaration of war, then this convention
may be neglected."

Or, again, treaties solemnly ratified between two Governments are
generally regarded as binding. And certainly a nation that never
kept such a treaty would find itself in a position where it was
impossible to make any treaties at all. Still, if upon a vague
calculation of men's memories, the acuteness of the circumstance,
the