amental convictions, than that of
arguing out a thesis with a lunatic.

Further, beneath this rationality there is in the madman a profound
belief in himself. Most of us regard with respect those who trust their
own judgment more than we find ourselves able to trust ours. But not the
most confident of them all can equal the unswerving confidence of a
madman. Sane people never wholly believe in themselves. They are liable
to be influenced by the opinion of others, and are willing to yield to
the consensus of opinion of past or present thinkers. The lunatic cares
nothing for the views of others. He believes in himself against the
world, with a terrific grip of conviction and a faith that nothing can
shake.

Mr. Chesterton applies his attack upon rationality to many subjects,
with singular ingenuity. In the question of marriage and divorce, for
instance, the modern school which would break loose from the ancient
bonds can present their case with an apparently unassailable show of
rationality. But his reply to them and to all other rationalists is that
life is not rational and consistent but paradoxical and contradictory.
To make life rational you have to leave out so many elements as to make
it shrink from a big world to a little one, which may be complete, but
can never be much of a world. Its conception of God may be a complete
conception, but its God is not much of a God. But the world of human
nature is a vast world, and the God of Christianity is an Infinite God.
The huge mysteries of life and death, of love and sacrifice, of the wine
of Cana and the Cross of Calvary--these outwit all logic and pass all
understanding. So for sane men there comes in a higher authority. You
may call it common sense, or mysticism, or faith, as you please. It is
the extra element by virtue of which all sane thinking and all religious
life are rendered possible. It is the secret spring of vitality alike in
human nature and in Christian faith.

At this point it may be permissible to question Mr. Chesterton's use of
words in one important point. He appears to fall into the old error of
confounding reason with reasoning. Reason is one thing and argument
another. It may be impossible to express either human nature or
religious faith in a series of syllogistic arguments, and yet both may
be reasonable in a higher sense. Reason includes those extra elements to
which Mr. Chesterton trusts. It is the synthesis of our whole powers of
finding tru