the letter of the law.] The obtaining of
goods under color of legal process [went on Judge Smithson, speaking
for the majority] may amount to larceny. In the present case it was
the province of the jury to ascertain the felonious intent. They have
settled that against the defendant as a question of fact, and the
court cannot say that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the
verdict. For what purpose did the defendant get the check? He was upon
the eve of failure. He had already hypothecated for his own debts
the loan of the city placed in his hands for sale--he had unlawfully
obtained five hundred thousand dollars in cash as loans; and it is
reasonable to suppose that he could obtain nothing more from the city
treasury by any ordinary means. Then it is that he goes there, and,
by means of a falsehood implied if not actual, obtains sixty thousand
dollars more. The jury has found the intent with which this was done."

It was in these words that Cowperwood's appeal for a new trial was
denied by the majority.

For himself and Judge Rafalsky, Judge Marvin, dissenting, wrote:

"It is plain from the evidence in the case that Mr. Cowperwood did not
receive the check without authority as agent to do so, and it has not
been clearly demonstrated that within his capacity as agent he did not
perform or intend to perform the full measure of the obligation which
the receipt of this check implied. It was shown in the trial that as a
matter of policy it was understood that purchases for the sinking-fund
should not be known or understood in the market or by the public in that
light, and that Mr. Cowperwood as agent was to have an absolutely
free hand in the disposal of his assets and liabilities so long as the
ultimate result was satisfactory. There was no particular time when the
loan was to be bought, nor was there any particular amount mentioned at
any time to be purchased. Unless the defendant intended at the time
he received the check fraudulently to appropriate it he could not be
convicted even on the first count. The verdict of the jury does not
establish this fact; the evidence does not show conclusively that it
could be established; and the same jury, upon three other counts, found
the defendant guilty without the semblance of shadow of evidence. How
can we say that their conclusions upon the first count are unerring when
they so palpably erred on the other counts? It is the opinion of the
minority that the verdict of