derations of the public interests, with such alterations in its
details as Congress may in its wisdom see fit to make.

I am well aware that this proposed alteration and amendment of the laws
establishing the Treasury Department has encountered various objections,
and that among others it has been proclaimed a Government bank of
fearful and dangerous import. It is proposed to confer upon it no
extraordinary power. It purports to do no more than pay the debts of the
Government with the redeemable paper of the Government, in which respect
it accomplishes precisely what the Treasury does daily at this time in
issuing to the public creditors the Treasury notes which under law it is
authorized to issue. It has no resemblance to an ordinary bank, as it
furnishes no profits to private stockholders and lends no capital to
individuals. If it be objected to as a Government bank and the objection
be available, then should all the laws in relation to the Treasury be
repealed and the capacity of the Government to collect what is due to
it or pay what it owes be abrogated.

This is the chief purpose of the proposed exchequer, and surely if
in the accomplishment of a purpose so essential it affords a sound
circulating medium to the country and facilities to trade it should be
regarded as no slight recommendation of it to public consideration.
Properly guarded by the provisions of law, it can run into no dangerous
evil, nor can any abuse arise under it but such as the Legislature
itself will be answerable for if it be tolerated, since it is but the
creature of the law and is susceptible at all times of modification,
amendment, or repeal at the pleasure of Congress. I know that it has
been objected that the system would be liable to be abused by the
Legislature, by whom alone it could be abused, in the party conflicts of
the day; that such abuse would manifest itself in a change of the law
which would authorize an excessive issue of paper for the purpose of
inflating prices and winning popular favor. To that it may be answered
that the ascription of such a motive to Congress is altogether
gratuitous and inadmissible. The theory of our institutions would
lead us to a different conclusion. But a perfect security against
a proceeding so reckless would be found to exist in the very nature
of things. The political party which should be so blind to the true
interests of the country as to resort to such an expedient would
inevitably meet with