investigation. Under every
disadvantage, he defended himself with spirit, and often with success. He
showed that many of the witnesses were his personal enemies, or undeserving
of credit; that his words and writings would bear a less offensive and more
probable interpretation; and that most of the facts objected to him were
either the acts of his officers, who alone ought to be responsible, or the
common decision of those boards of which he was only a single member.[1]
Thus far[a] he had conducted his defence without legal aid. To speak to
matters of law, he was allowed the aid of counsel, who contended that not
one of the offences alleged against him amounted to high treason; that
their number could not change their quality; that an endeavour to subvert
the law, or religion, or the rights of parliament, was not treason by any
statute; and that the description of an offence, so vague and indeterminate
ought never to be admitted;: otherwise the slightest transgression might,
under that denomination, be converted into the highest crime known to the
law.[2]

But the Commons, whether they distrusted the patriotism of the Lords, or
doubted the legal guilt of the prisoner, had already resolved to proceed by
attainder. After the second reading[b] of the ordinance, they sent for the
venerable prisoner to their bar, and ordered Brown, one of the managers, to
recapitulate in his

[Footnote 1: Compare his own daily account of his trial in History,
220-421, with that part published by Prynne, under the title of
Canterburies Doome, 1646; and Rushworth, v. 772.]

[Footnote 2: See it in Laud's History, 423.]

[Sidenote a: A.D. 1644. March 11.]
[Sidenote b: A.D. 1644. Nov. 2.]

hearing the evidence against him, together with his answers. Some days
later[a] he was recalled, and suffered to speak in his own defence. After
his departure, Brown made a long reply; and the house, without further
consideration, passed[b] the bill of attainder, and adjudged him to suffer
the penalties of treason.[1] The reader will not fail to observe this
flagrant perversion of the forms of justice. It was not as in the case of
the earl of Strafford. The commons had not been present at the trial
of Laud; they had not heard the evidence, they had not even read the
depositions of the witnesses; they pronounced judgment on the credit of
the unsworn and partial statement made by their own advocate. Such a
proceeding, so subversive of right and equity, would