s monstrous and insulting dictation to Servia (23rd July), and
Servia's incredibly humble apology (25th), Austria was still not
allowed to accept the latter, and the conference proposed (26th July) by
Sir E. Grey--though accepted by France, Russia, and Italy--was refused
by Germany (27th). On the 28th Austria declared war on Servia. It was
perfectly clear to every one that Russia--after what had happened before
in 1908-9, with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina--could not possibly
allow this insult to Servia to pass. Germany, therefore, by this move
forced Russia's hand; and at a moment when Russia was known or supposed
to be comparatively unprepared.[11] France had been involved in some
military scandals and was still debating as to the two years' instead of
three years' period for her normal military service. The German
Ambassador at Vienna had openly said that France was not in a condition
for facing a war. England was currently supposed in Germany to be
seriously hampered by domestic troubles at home--chiefly of course
among the Irish, but also amongst the Suffragettes(!) _and_ by
widespread disaffection in India. It was thought, therefore, that
England would certainly remain neutral--and I think we may fairly say
that the extent to which Germany counted on this expected neutrality is
evidenced by her disappointment and public rage when she found that she
was mistaken.

Germany's initiative in the matter is further evidenced by her _instant
readiness_ to attack. She was in Luxemburg within a few hours of the
declaration of war with Russia; and it was clearly her intention to
"rush" Paris and then turn back upon Russia.

It may be said that from her own point of view Germany was quite right
to take the initiative. If she sincerely believed that the _Entente_ was
plotting her downfall, she was justified in attacking instead of waiting
to be attacked. That may be so. It is the line to which General
Bernhardi again returns in his latest book (_Britain as Germany's
Vassal_, translated by J. Ellis Barker). But it does not alter the fact
that this was an immense responsibility to take, and that the immediate
onus of the war rests with Germany. If she under all the above
circumstances precipitated war, she can hardly be surprised if the
judgment of Europe (one may also say the world) is against her. If she
has played her cards so badly as to put herself entirely in the wrong,
she must naturally "dree her weird."

There rem