or for what reason,
he cannot pretend to determine. There is a manner, a grace, an ease, a
genteelness, an I-know-not-what, which some men possess above others,
which is very different from external beauty and comeliness, and which,
however, catches our affection almost as suddenly and powerfully. And
though this MANNER be chiefly talked of in the passion between the
sexes, where the concealed magic is easily explained, yet surely much
of it prevails in all our estimation of characters, and forms no
inconsiderable part of personal merit. This class of accomplishments,
therefore, must be trusted entirely to the blind, but sure testimony of
taste and sentiment; and must be considered as a part of ethics, left by
nature to baffle all the pride of philosophy, and make her sensible of
her narrow boundaries and slender acquisitions.

We approve of another, because of his wit, politeness, modesty, decency,
or any agreeable quality which he possesses; although he be not of our
acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of
these accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his
acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives
us the sentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the
judgements which we form concerning manners and characters.

SECTION IX. CONCLUSION.

PART I.

IT may justly appear surprising that any man in so late an age, should
find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning, that Personal Merit
consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, USEFUL or
AGREEABLE to the PERSON HIMSELF or to OTHERS. It might be expected that
this principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unpractised
enquirers concerning morals, and been received from its own evidence,
without any argument or disputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind,
so naturally classes itself under the division of USEFUL or AGREEABLE,
the UTILE or the DULCE, that it is not easy to imagine why we should
ever seek further, or consider the question as a matter of nice research
or inquiry. And as every thing useful or agreeable must possess these
qualities with regard either to the PERSON HIMSELF or to OTHERS, the
complete delineation or description of merit seems to be performed as
naturally as a shadow is cast by the sun, or an image is reflected upon
water. If the ground, on which the shadow is cast, be not broken and
uneven; nor the surface from w