umping
of individuals and their original powers into a few sharply marked-off
classes; it has taught us that original capacities are indefinitely
numerous and variable. It is but the other side of this fact to say
that in the degree in which society has become democratic, social
organization means utilization of the specific and variable qualities
of individuals, not stratification by classes. Although his educational
philosophy was revolutionary, it was none the less in bondage to static
ideals. He thought that change or alteration was evidence of lawless
flux; that true reality was unchangeable. Hence while he would radically
change the existing state of society, his aim was to construct a state
in which change would subsequently have no place. The final end of life
is fixed; given a state framed with this end in view, not even
minor details are to be altered. Though they might not be inherently
important, yet if permitted they would inure the minds of men to the
idea of change, and hence be dissolving and anarchic. The breakdown of
his philosophy is made apparent in the fact that he could not trust to
gradual improvements in education to bring about a better society which
should then improve education, and so on indefinitely. Correct education
could not come into existence until an ideal state existed, and after
that education would be devoted simply to its conservation. For the
existence of this state he was obliged to trust to some happy accident
by which philosophic wisdom should happen to coincide with possession of
ruling power in the state.

4. The "Individualistic" Ideal of the Eighteenth Century. In the
eighteenth-century philosophy we find ourselves in a very different
circle of ideas. "Nature" still means something antithetical to existing
social organization; Plato exercised a great influence upon Rousseau.
But the voice of nature now speaks for the diversity of individual
talent and for the need of free development of individuality in all
its variety. Education in accord with nature furnishes the goal and the
method of instruction and discipline. Moreover, the native or original
endowment was conceived, in extreme cases, as nonsocial or even as
antisocial. Social arrangements were thought of as mere external
expedients by which these nonsocial individuals might secure a greater
amount of private happiness for themselves. Nevertheless, these
statements convey only an inadequate idea of the true significanc