you were an
annual possessor before me, for you are the plaintiff. As far as I am
concerned, it is not for me to tell you how I possess, nor how long
I have possessed. _Possideo quia possideo_. I have no other reply, no
other defence. When you have shown that your action is admissible, then
we will see whether you are entitled to lift the veil which hides the
origin of my possession.'"

And this is what is honored with the name of jurisprudence and
philosophy,--the restoration of force. What! when I have "moulded matter
by my labor" [I quote M. Troplong]; when I have "deposited in it a
portion of myself" [M. Troplong]; when I have "re-created it by
my industry, and set upon it the seal of my intelligence" [M.
Troplong],--on the ground that I have not possessed it for a year, a
stranger may dispossess me, and the law offers me no protection! And if
M. Troplong is my judge, M. Troplong will condemn me! And if I resist
my adversary,--if, for this bit of mud which I may call MY FIELD, and
of which they wish to rob me, a war breaks out between the two
competitors,--the legislator will gravely wait until the stronger,
having killed the other, has had possession for a year! No, no, Monsieur
Troplong! you do not understand the words of the law; for I prefer
to call in question your intelligence rather than the justice of the
legislator. You are mistaken in your application of the principle, _In
pari causa possessor potior habetur:_ the actuality of possession here
refers to him who possessed at the time when the difficulty arose, not
to him who possesses at the time of the complaint. And when the code
prohibits the reception of _actions possessoires_, in cases where the
possession is not of a year's duration, it simply means that if, before
a year has elapsed, the holder relinquishes possession, and ceases
actually to occupy _in propria persona_, he cannot avail himself of an
_action possessoire_ against his successor. In a word, the code treats
possession of less than a year as it ought to treat all possession,
however long it has existed,--that is, the condition of property ought
to be, not merely seisin for a year, but perpetual seisin.

I will not pursue this analysis farther. When an author bases two
volumes of quibbles on foundations so uncertain, it may be boldly
declared that his work, whatever the amount of learning displayed in it,
is a mess of nonsense unworthy a critic's attention.

At this point, sir, I seem