llery, these gibes at the cavalry expressed a
serious, tho' mistaken idea, they had of them. Upon the advance of the
enemy, of course, we were accustomed to see cavalrymen hurrying in from
the outposts to the rear, to report. So the thoughtless infantry, not
considering that this was "part of the large and general plan," got
fixed in their minds an association between the two things,--the advance
of the enemy, and, the rapid hurrying off to the rear of the cavalry,
until they came to have the fixed idea, that the sight of the enemy
_always_ made a cavalryman "hungry for solitude." They reasoned that, as
a mounted man was much better _fixed_ for running away than a footman,
it was, by so much, natural that he _should_ run away, and was, by so
much, the more likely to do it.

Also, our orders to move and to go into battle were always brought by
horsemen; so the horsemen were thought about as _causing others to
fight_ instead of _doing it themselves_. So, in short, it came to pass,
that this innocent infantry had a dim sort of notion that the chief end
of the cavalry was, in battle time, to run away and bring up other
people to do the fighting, and in quiet time, to "range" for buttermilk
and other delicacies, which the poor footmen never got. Hence the
soubriquet of "buttermilk ranger" universally applied to the cavalry by
the army.

But, I assure you, that all this was dispelled at once, and for good and
all, at Spottsylvania. Here had these gallants gotten down off their
horses. They hadn't run _anywhere at all_; didn't want anybody else to
come, and fight for them. They had jumped into about five or six times
their number of the flower of the Federal infantry. They met them front
to front, and muzzle to muzzle. Of course they had to give back; but it
was slowly, _very slowly_, and they made the enemy pay, in blood, for
every step they gained. They had worried these Federals into a fever,
and kept them fooling away nearly twenty-six hours of priceless time;
and made Grant's plan _fail_, and made General Lee's plan succeed, and
had secured the strong line for our defence.

It was a piece of regular, obstinate, bloody, "bulldog" work. We knew,
well as we thought of ourselves, that not the staunchest brigade of our
veteran "incomparable" infantry, or battery of our canister-shooting
artillery, could have _fought_ better, _stood_ better, or _achieved
more_, for the success of the campaign. We felt that General Lee,--that