VICTORIA R.

[Pageheading: POLICY OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON]

_The Earl of Malmesbury to Queen Victoria._

_15th May 1859._

The Earl of Malmesbury presents his humble duty to the Queen, and has
the honour to inform your Majesty that Count de Persigny[36] called on
him yesterday. He passed an hour in attempting to prove what it seems
he really believes himself--that the Emperor had no plan or even
intention to make war in Italy; that His Imperial Majesty was drawn
into it step by step by M. de Cavour, who finally menaced to publish
his most confidential correspondence, etc.; that his army was totally
unprepared, and is now in a very imperfect state, and that he himself
was overcome with surprise and fear when he learnt in the middle of
last month that the Austrians had 120,000 men on the Ticino.[37] The
Emperor, however, now believes that he will easily gain a _couple_
of victories, and that when he has _rejete les Autrichiens dans leur
taniere_ (by which he means their great fortresses), he will return
to govern at Paris, and leave a Marshal to carry on the sieges and the
war. M. de Persigny's letters of appointment are not yet signed, and
must go to Italy to be so. He stated that a week ago he was named
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that Fould,[38] Walewski, and others
were to be dismissed, but that two days before the Emperor's departure
Madame Walewska[39] and the Empress had on their knees obtained a
reprieve, and that M. de Persigny was ordered to come here _sans
raisonner_...

[Footnote 36: Who had been re-appointed to London, where
Marshal Pelissier, Duc de Malakhoff, had replaced him in 1858.
See _ante_, 23rd March, 1858. Both Malakhoff and Walewski were
out of sympathy with the Emperor's present policy.]

[Footnote 37: Sir James Hudson, in a letter written at
Turin on the 28th of February, and shown to Queen Victoria,
described an interview with Cavour, who, in answer to the
direct question, "Do you mean to attack Austria?" replied
that the Italian question was becoming so complex that it was
impossible to say what might happen. Sir J. Hudson added that
he had learned confidentially that the understanding on the
same subject between Cavour and the Emperor Napoleon was
complete, and that it had been expressed thus: "Non seulement
nous prendrons la premiere occasion de faire la guerre a
l'Autriche, mais nous chercherons un pretexte."]