providence, to whom evil cannot be imputed. Moral guilt has not
been imputed to Las Casas, and if the importation of African slaves into
America, had the effect of preventing more suffering than it inflicted,
it was good, both in the motive and the result. I freely admit that, it
is hardly possible to justify morally, those who begun and carried on
the slave trade. No speculation of future good to be brought about,
could compensate the enormous amount of evil it occasioned.

If we should refer to the common moral sense of mankind, as determined
by their conduct in all ages and countries, for a standard of morality,
it would seem to be in favor of slavery. The will of God, as determined
by utility, would be an infallible standard, if we had an unerring
measure of utility. The utilitarian philosophy, as it is commonly
understood, referring only to the animal wants and employments, and
physical condition of man, is utterly false and degrading. If a
sufficiently extended definition be given to utility, so as to include
every thing that may be a source of enjoyment or suffering, it is for
the most part useless. How can you compare the pleasures resulting from
the exercise of the understanding, the taste and the imagination, with
the animal enjoyments of the senses--the gratification derived from a
fine poem with that from a rich banquet? How are we to weigh the pains
and enjoyments of one man highly cultivated and of great sensibility,
against those of many men of blunter capacity for enjoyment or
suffering? And if we could determine with certainty in what utility
consists, we are so short-sighted with respect to consequences--the
remote results of our best considered actions are so often wide of our
anticipations, or contrary to them, that we should still be very much in
the dark. But though we cannot arrive at absolute certainty with respect
to the utility of actions, it is always fairly matter of argument.
Though an imperfect standard, it is the best we have, and perhaps the
Creator did not intend that we should arrive at perfect certainty with
regard to the morality of many actions. If, after the most careful
examination of consequences that we are able to make, with due distrust
of ourselves, we impartially, and in good faith, decide for that which
appears likely to produce the greatest good, we are free from moral
guilt. And I would impress most earnestly, that with our imperfect and
limited faculties, and short-sighte