y was to replace the gunboats by rowing barges, similar to, but
more powerful than, those used by the enemy in his attacks. The
insuperable trouble here proved to be that men fit for such work, fit
to contend with the seamen of the enemy, were unwilling to abandon the
sea, with its hopes of prize money, or to submit to the exposure and
discomfort of the life. "The crews of the gunboats," wrote Captain
Campbell, "consist of all nations except Turks, Greeks, and Jews." On
one occasion the ship's company of an American privateer, which had
been destroyed after a desperate and celebrated resistance to attack
by British armed boats, arrived at St. Mary's. Of one hundred and
nineteen American seamen, only four could be prevailed upon to enter
the district naval force.[199] This was partly due to the
embarrassment of the national finances. "The want of funds to pay off
discharged men," wrote the naval captain at Charleston, "has given
such a character to the navy as to stop recruiting."[200] "Men could
be had," reported his colleague at St. Mary's, now transferred to
Savannah, "were it not for the Treasury notes, which cannot be passed
at less than five per cent discount. Men will not ship without cash.
There are upwards of a hundred seamen in port, but they refuse to
enter, even though we offer to ship for a month only."[201]

During the American Civil War, fifty years after the time of which we
are speaking, this internal communication was effectually intercepted
by stationing inside steamers of adequate force; but that recourse,
while not absolutely impracticable for small sailing cruisers,
involved a risk disproportionate to the gain. Through traffic could
have been broken up by keeping a frigate in any one of the three
sounds, entrance to which was practicable for vessels of that class.
In view of the amount of trade passing back and forth, which Campbell
stated to be in one period of four months as much as eight million
dollars, it is surprising that this obvious expedient was not adopted
by the enemy. That they appreciated the situation is shown by the
intention, announced in 1813, of seizing one of the islands; which was
effected in January, 1815, by the occupation of Cumberland and St.
Simons'. As it was, up to that late period the routine methods of
their European experience prevailed, with the result that their
coastwise operations in the south differed little from those in the
extreme north. Smaller vessels occasio