red on the
line of march; to one and all of these the pacific nature of the
expedition was carefully explained.
"The force left Pitsani Camp at 6.30 P.M., December 29, and marched
through the night. At 5.15 A.M., on the morning of the 30th, the
column reached the village of Malmani (thirty-nine miles distant
from Pitsani). Presently, at the same moment, the advanced guard of
the Mafeking Column (under Colonel Grey) reached the village, and
the junction was effected between the two bodies....
"From Malmani I pushed on as rapidly as possible in order to cross
in daylight the very dangerous defile at Lead Mines. This place,
distant seventy-one miles from Pitsani, was passed at 5.30 P.M.,
December 30.
"I was subsequently informed that a force of several hundred Boers,
sent from Lichtenburg to intercept the force at this point, missed
doing so by three hours only.
"At our next 'off-saddle' Dr. Jameson received a letter from the
Commandant-General of the Transvaal demanding to know the reason of
our advance, and ordering us to return immediately. A reply was sent
to this, explaining Dr. Jameson's reasons in the same terms as those
used to the force at Pitsani.
"At Doomport (ninety-one miles from Pitsani), during an 'off-saddle'
early on Tuesday morning, December 31, a mounted messenger overtook
us, and presented a letter from the High Commissioner, which
contained an order to Dr. Jameson and myself to return at once to
Mafeking and Pitsani.
"A retreat by now was out of the question, and to comply with these
instructions an impossibility. In the first place, there was
absolutely no food for men or horses along the road which we had
recently followed; secondly, three days at least would be necessary
for our horses, jaded with forced marching, to return; on the road
ahead we were sure of finding, at all events, some food for man and
beast. Furthermore, we had by now traversed almost two-thirds of the
total distance; a large force of Boers was known to be intercepting
our retreat, and we were convinced that any retrograde movement
would bring on an attack of Boers from all sides.
"It was felt, therefore, that to ensure the safety of our little
force, no alternative remained but to push on to Krugersdorp to our
friends, who, we were confident, would be awaiting our arrival
there.
"Apart from the above considerations, even had it been possible to
effect a retreat from Doomport, we knew that Johannesburg had
ris
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