OUR RELATIONS WITH MEXICO.

But the scheme of war did not develop as rapidly as was desired by
the hot advocates of territorial expansion. A show of negotiation
for peace was kept up by dispatching Mr. John Slidell as minister
to Mexico upon the hint that that government might be willing to
renew diplomatic relations. When Mr. Slidell reached the city of
Mexico he found a violent contest raging over the Presidency of
the republic, the principal issue being between the war and anti-
war parties. Mr. Slidell was not received. The Mexican Government
declared, with somewhat of reason and consistency, that they had
been willing to listen to a special envoy who would treat singly
and promptly of the grave questions between the two republics, but
they would not accept a minister plenipotentiary who would sit down
near their government in a leisurely manner, as if friendly relations
existed, and select his own time for negotiation,--urging or
postponing, threatening or temporizing, as the pressure of political
interests in the United States might suggest. Mr. Slidell returned
home; but still the conflict of arms, though so imminent, was not
immediately precipitated. Mr. Polk's cautious and somewhat timid
course represented the resultant between the aggressive Democrat
of the South who was for war regardless of consequences, and the
Free-soil Democrat of the North who was for peace regardless of
consequences; the one feeling sure that war would strengthen the
institution of slavery, the other confident that peace would favor
the growth of freedom. As not infrequently happens in the evolution
of human events, each was mistaken in the final issue. The war,
undertaken for the extension of slavery, led in the end to its
destruction.

The leading influence in Mr. Polk's cabinet was divided between
Mr. Buchanan, secretary of State, and Mr. Marcy, secretary of War.
Both were men of conservative minds, of acute judgment in political
affairs of long experience in public life; and each was ambitious
for the succession to the Presidency. Neither could afford to
disregard the dominant opinion of the Southern Democracy; still
less could either countenance a reckless policy, which might
seriously embarrass our foreign affairs, and precipitate a dangerous
crisis in our relations with England. These eminent statesmen
quickly perceived that the long-standing issue touching our north-
western boundary, commonly known