ilosophy would be worth little if it had not at its disposal more
extensive resources than those of a song-writer. M. Cousin therefore
looked the difficulty in the face. Victory is always good. But how shall
young Frenchmen be made to hear this with regard to that signal defeat
of the armies of France? Listen: "It is not populations which appear on
battle-fields, but ideas and causes. So at Leipzig and at Waterloo two
causes came to the encounter, the cause of paternal monarchy and that of
military democracy. Which of them carried the day, Gentlemen? Neither
the one nor the other. Who was the conqueror and who the conquered at
Waterloo? Gentlemen, there were none conquered. (_Applause._) No, I
protest that there were none: the only conquerors were European
civilization and the map. (_Unanimous and prolonged applause._)"[150]

To make the youth of Paris applaud at the remembrance of Waterloo is
perhaps one of the most brilliant triumphs of eloquence which the annals
of history record. But this rhetorical success is not a triumph of
truth. There were those who were conquered at Waterloo; and, to judge by
what has been going on for some time past in Europe, it would seem that
those who were conquered are bent on taking their revenge. We may infer
from these facts that all triumphs are not good, since truth may be for
a moment overcome by a false philosophy tricked out in the deceitful
adornments of eloquence.

But let us admit, whatever our opinion on the subject, that the Waterloo
rock has been passed successfully; we have not yet pointed out the main
difficulty which rises up in the way of this system. If victory is
good, it seems at first sight that defeat is bad. But defeat is the
necessary condition of victory; and being the condition of good, it
seems therefore that it also is good; and the mind comes logically to
this conclusion: "Victory is good;--defeat is good, since it is the
condition of victory;--all is good." We set out with the glorification
of victory, and, lo! we are arrived at the glorification of fact. All
that is, has the right to be; in the eyes of the modern savant whatever
is, is right. M. Cousin laid down the principle; he laid it down in a
general manner in his philosophical eclecticism, of which it was easy to
make use, as has in fact been done, in a sense contrary to his real
intentions. Our young critics, wasting an inheritance of which they do
not appear always to recognize the origin, are doin