note: Evils of Separation]

Englishmen are so firmly and with such good reason convinced that the
independence of Ireland would be fatal to the greatness and security of
Great Britain, that they rarely attempt to weigh accurately the grounds
of reason which may be adduced in support of a conviction which has
acquired the character of a political instinct. The evils, however, to
England which may be reasonably anticipated from the political
separation of the two countries may be summed up under three heads.

_First_.--The acquiescence by England in Irish independence would be a
deliberate and complete surrender of the objects at which English
statesmanship has, under one form or another, aimed for centuries. Such
a surrender would, in addition to its material effects, inflict an
amount of moral discredit on England which would itself be the cause of
serious dangers. That a powerful nation should (except under the force
of crushing defeat) assent to an arrangement which would decrease its
resources and authority must inevitably appear to all the world to be,
and probably would be in reality, such a sign either of declining
strength or of declining spirit as would in a short time provoke the
aggression of rivals and enemies. Abdication of royal or imperial
authority is with States no less than with individuals the precursor of
death. Loss of territory, indeed, in consequence of defeat, is in itself
only in so far damaging as defeat may imply a want of capacity to resist
attack, or as the diminution of territory may involve loss of resources.
Thus the surrender of Lombardy by Austria, of Alsace by France, of
Schleswig-Holstein by Denmark, the acquiescence of Holland in the
independence of Belgium; or, to come nearer home, the treaty by which
England acknowledged that the struggle to retain her American colonies
had ended in failure, each and all of them brought only such discredit
upon the defeated country as is the direct consequence of want of
success. None, of these transactions had anything like the disastrous
results which the concession of Irish independence would entail on
England. The Austrians, the French, the Danes, and the Dutch had, as the
whole world admitted, struggled manfully to maintain their power. They
were beaten as one party or other to a fight must be beaten, but they
did not betray any of those failings which encourage further attack. The
close of the conflict with our colonies assuredly did not leave