injustice of the case the influence
lies, and not in the importance of the individual.

"Law is called 'the perfection of reason.' Is there not danger of its
being regarded as the very climax of absurdity if fictions of this
kind can be turned into realities on the mere caprice of power. As a
distinguished English journalist has suggested in reference to the
case, 'though the law may doubtless be satisfied by the majority in
the Court of Appeal, yet common sense and common law would be widely
antagonistic if sentence were to follow a judgment so obtained.'

"On all grounds then I submit, in conclusion, this is not a case for
sentence. Waving for the purpose the international objection, and
appealing to British practice itself, I say it is not a fair case for
sentence. The professed policy of that practice has ever been to give
the benefit of doubt to the prisoner. Judges in their charges to
juries have ever theorized on this principle, and surely judges
themselves will not refuse to give practical effect to the theory. If
ever there was a case which more than another was suggestive of
doubt, it is surely one in which so many judges have pronounced
against the legality of the trial and the validity of the conviction
on which you are about to pass sentence. Each of these judges, be it
remembered, held competent in his individuality to administer the
criminal law of the country--each of whom, in fact, in his
individuality does so administer it unchallenged and unquestioned.

"A sentence under such circumstances, be it for a long period or a
short would be wanting in the element of moral effect--the effect of
example--which could alone give it value, and which is professedly
the aim of all legal punishment. A sentence under such circumstances
would be far from reassuring to the public mind as to the
'certainties' of the law, and would fail to commend the approval or
win the respect of any man 'within the realm or without.' While to
the prisoner, to the sufferer in chief, it would only bring the
bitter, and certainly not the repentant feeling that he suffered in
the wrong--that he was the victim of an injustice based on an
inference which not even the tyrant's plea of necessity can
sustain--namely, that at a particular time he was at a distance of
three thousand miles from the place where he then actually stood in
bo