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ed from in practice in this country, and though not affirmatively recognized in most statutes--the Massachusetts statute, for instance, carefully avoids providing that the corporation may own stock in other companies--yet the practice has been universally ratified by the courts, if not by the implications of legislation. This new tendency to forbid it therefore is merely a return to common-law doctrine. Thus,[2] in 1903 only five States--Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania--provided generally that a corporation might own stock in another corporation; two States--Indiana and Minnesota--so provided as to manufacturing or mining companies. In New York, Ohio, and other States, a corporation could only own stock in another corporation engaged in a similar business, or a business useful or subsidiary, or in a corporation (New York) with which it was legally entitled to consolidate; but the tendency of recent legislation is precisely opposite on this point, forbidding stockholding by all corporations in similar or competing companies, or more specifically forbidding stockholding in similar or competing companies, as well as stockholding by railroads in railroad companies. [Footnote 1: See below, chap. 16.] [Footnote 2: MacLeod, p. 203.] The practice of permitting the free holding of stock by corporations, and especially by holding corporations, has been undoubtedly harmful to the public, and to the public morals, and has been the main cause making possible the speedy acquisition of immense private fortunes. The stockholding trust or the device by which (as in the Rock Island Railway system) a corporation is created for the purpose of holding half the stock of the real corporation and then possibly a third corporation, still to hold half the stock in the second, each of them parting with the other half, obviously makes possible the control of immense properties by persons having a comparatively small real interest. It is a mere arithmetical proposition, for instance, in the case mentioned, that whereas in one corporation it takes one-half of the stock to control it, the first holding company will enable it to be controlled by one-fourth and the second by one-eighth of the original stock. Legislation should properly be much more drastic on this point; but indeed our whole corporation legislation seems rather to have been drawn by able lawyers with a view of protecting the corporation or the person wh
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