ry different sort of courage to lie down
on the crest of a hill and fire at an enemy struggling up it in full
view, to that which is necessary to make the assault. They have too
all the advantage of knowing the ground, while we know absolutely
nothing about it. I don't believe that the generals have any more idea
than we have. It seems a happy-go-lucky way of fighting altogether.
However, I have no doubt that we shall lick them somehow. It seems,
though, a pity to take troops direct at a position which the enemy
have chosen and fortified, when by a flank march, which in an
undulating country like this could be performed without the slightest
difficulty, we could turn the position and force them to retreat,
without losing a man."

Such was the opinion of many other officers at the time. Such has been
the opinion of every military critic since. Had the army made a flank
march, the enemy must either have retired at once, or have been liable
to an attack upon their right flank, when, if beaten, they would have
been driven down to the sea-shore under the guns of the ships, and
killed or captured, to a man. Unfortunately, however, owing to the
jealousies between the two generals, the illness of Marshal Arnaud,
and the incapacity of Lord Raglan, there was neither plan nor concert.
The armies simply fought as they marched, each general of division
doing his best and leading his men at that portion of the enemy's
position which happened to be opposite to him. The sole understanding
arrived at was that the armies were to march at six in the morning;
that General Bosquet's division, which was next to the sea, was,
covered by guns of the ships, to first carry the enemy's position
there; and that when he had obtained a footing upon the plateau, a
general attack was to be made. Even this plan, simple as it was, was
not fully carried out, as Lord Raglan did not move his troops till
nine in the morning. Three precious hours were therefore wasted, and a
pursuit after the battle which would have turned the defeat into a
rout was therefore prevented, and Sebastopol saved, to cost tens of
thousands of lives before it fell. The Russian position on the Alma
was along a crest of hills. On their left by the sea these rose
precipitously, offering great difficulties for an assault. Further
inland, however, the slope became easy, and towards the right centre
and right against which the English attack was directed, the hill was
simply a slope bro