rse
thing for Russia. Japan was already suffering terribly from the drain
upon her men, and especially upon her resources, and had nothing further
to gain from continuance of the struggle; its continuance meant to her
more loss than gain, even if she were victorious. Russia, in spite of
her gigantic strength, was, in my judgment, apt to lose even more than
she had already lost if the struggle continued. I deemed it probable
that she would no more be able successfully to defend Eastern Siberia
and Northern Manchuria than she had been able to defend Southern
Manchuria and Korea. If the war went on, I thought it, on the whole,
likely that Russia would be driven west of Lake Baikal. But it was very
far from certain. There is no certainty in such a war. Japan might have
met defeat, and defeat to her would have spelt overwhelming disaster;
and even if she had continued to win, what she thus won would have been
of no value to her, and the cost in blood and money would have left her
drained white. I believed, therefore, that the time had come when it
was greatly to the interest of both combatants to have peace, and when
therefore it was possible to get both to agree to peace.

I first satisfied myself that each side wished me to act, but that,
naturally and properly, each side was exceedingly anxious that the other
should not believe that the action was taken on its initiative. I then
sent an identical note to the two powers proposing that they should
meet, through their representatives, to see if peace could not be made
directly between them, and offered to act as an intermediary in bringing
about such a meeting, but not for any other purpose. Each assented to my
proposal in principle. There was difficulty in getting them to agree
on a common meeting place; but each finally abandoned its original
contention in the matter, and the representatives of the two nations
finally met at Portsmouth, in New Hampshire. I previously received the
two delegations at Oyster Bay on the U. S. S. Mayflower, which, together
with another naval vessel, I put at their disposal, on behalf of the
United States Government, to take them from Oyster Bay to Portsmouth.

As is customary--but both unwise and undesirable--in such cases,
each side advanced claims which the other could not grant. The chief
difficulty came because of Japan's demand for a money indemnity. I felt
that it would be better for Russia to pay some indemnity than to go on
with the wa