ervous system, contained in this volume, were he
not in a position to discuss both subjects in the terms used by the modern
scientist, when speaking of the glandular and nervous systems from the
standpoint of science.

In spite of the fact that it may be said that he who speaks concerning
"heat," as is done here, knows nothing of the elements of modern physics,
yet the author feels himself quite justified, because he believes that he
knows present day research along those lines, and because if it were
unknown to him, he would have left the subject alone. He knows that such
utterances may be ascribed to lack of modesty, but it is necessary to
declare his true motives, lest they should be confounded with others of a
very different nature, a result infinitely worse than a verdict of mere
vanity.

He who reads this book as a philosopher, may well ask himself, "Has this
author been asleep to present day research in the field of the theory of
cognition? Had he never heard of the existence of a man called Kant?" this
philosopher might ask, "and did he not know that according to this man it
was simply inadmissible, from a philosophic point of view, to put forward
such statements?" and so on, while in conclusion he might remark that
stuff of so uncritical, childish, and unprofessional a nature should not
be tolerated among philosophers, and that any further investigation would
be waste of time. However, here again, for reasons already advanced and at
the risk of being again misinterpreted, the writer would fain introduce
certain personal experiences.

His studies of Kant date from his sixteenth year, and he really believes
he is now capable of criticizing quite objectively, from the Kantian point
of view, everything that has been put forward in this book. On this
account, too, he might have left this book unwritten were he not fully
aware of what moves a philosopher to pass the verdict of "childishness"
whenever the critical standard of the day is applied. Yet one may actually
know that in the Kantian sense the limits of possible knowledge are here
exceeded: one may know in what way Herbart (who never arrived at an
"arrangement of ideas") would discover his "naive realism." One may even
know the degree to which the modern pragmatism of James and Schiller and
others would find the bounds of "true presentments" transgressed--those
presentments which we are able to make our own, to vindicate, enforce, and
to verify.

We may kno