and its consequences. If he does a deed which is
destructive to human rights, it shall destroy his rights
and deprive him of property, personal freedom, or even of
life. But corrective punishment assumes immaturity of
development and consequent lack of freedom. It belongs to
the period of nurture, and not to the period of maturity.
The tendency in our schools is, however, to displace the
forms of mere corrective punishment (corporal
chastisement), and to substitute for them forms founded on
retribution--_e.g._, deprivation of privileges. See secs.
42 and 43.

[13] Faust; Part I., Scene I. "How all weaves itself into
the Whole! Each works and lives in the other! How the
heavenly influences ascend and descend, and reach each
other the golden buckets!"

[14] Hume, in his famous sketch of the Human
Understanding, makes all the perceptions of the human mind
resolve themselves into two distinct kinds: _impressions_
and _ideas_. "The difference between them consists in the
degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike
upon the mind, and make their way into our thought and
consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with the most
force and violence we may name _impressions_, and under
this name include all our sensations, passions, and
emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul.
By _ideas_, I mean the faint images of these in thinking
and reasoning." "The identity which we ascribe to the mind
of man is only a fictitious one."

From this we see that his stand-point is that of "sensuous
ideas," the first stage of reflection. The second or third
stage of reflection, if consistent, would not admit the
reality to be the object of sense-impressions, and the
abstract ideas to be only "faint images." One who holds,
like Herbert Spencer, that persistent force is the
ultimate reality--"the sole truth, which transcends
experience by underlying it"--ought to hold that the
generalization which reaches the idea of unity of force is
the truest and most adequate of thoughts. And yet Herbert
Spencer holds substantially the doctrine of Hume, in the
words: "We must predicate nothing of objects too great or
too multitudinous to be mentally represented, or we must
make our predications by means of extremely inadequate
representations of such objects--mere symbols of them."
(Page 27 of "First Principles.")

End of Pr