ime, the
presumption of death arises at the expiration of seven years from the
date on which he was last heard of. That is to say, that the total
disappearance of an individual for seven years constitutes presumptive
evidence that the said individual is dead; and the presumption can be
set aside only by the production of evidence that he was alive at some
time within that period of seven years. But if, on the other hand, it
is sought to presume the death of a person who has been absent for a
shorter period than seven years, it is necessary to produce such
evidence as shall make it highly probable that the said person is dead.
Of course, presumption implies supposition as opposed to actual
demonstration; but, nevertheless, the evidence in such a case must be
of a kind that tends to create a very strong belief that death has
occurred; and I need hardly say that the shorter the period of absence,
the more convincing must be the evidence.

"In the present case, the testator, John Bellingham, has been absent
somewhat under two years. This is a relatively short period, and in
itself gives rise to no presumption of death. Nevertheless, death has
been presumed in a case where the period of absence was even shorter
and the insurance recovered; but here the evidence supporting the
belief in the occurrence of death was exceedingly weighty.

"The testator in this case was a shipmaster, and his disappearance was
accompanied by the disappearance of the ship and the entire ship's
company in the course of a voyage from London to Marseilles. The loss
of the ship and her crew was the only reasonable explanation of the
disappearance, and, short of actual demonstration, the facts offered
convincing evidence of the death of all persons on board. I mention
this case as an illustration. You are not dealing with speculative
probabilities. You are contemplating a very momentous proceeding, and
you must be very sure of your ground. Consider what it is that you are
asked to do.

"The petitioner asks permission to presume the death of the testator in
order that the testator's property may be distributed among the
beneficiaries under the will. The granting of such permission involves
us in the gravest responsibility. An ill-considered decision might be
productive of a serious injustice to the testator, an injustice that
could never be remedied. Hence it is incumbent upon you to weigh the
evidence with the greatest care, to come to no