ry."

I laughed heartily, but Mr. Jellicoe preserved a wooden solemnity and
continued to examine me through his spectacles (which I, in my turn,
inspected and estimated at about minus five dioptres). There was
something highly diverting about this grim lawyer, with his dry
contentiousness and almost farcical caution. His ostentatious reserve
encouraged me to ply him with fresh questions, the more indiscreet the
better.

"I suppose," said I, "that, under these circumstances, you would hardly
favor Mr. Hurst's proposal to apply for permission to presume death?"

"Under what circumstances?" he inquired.

"I was referring to the doubt you have expressed as to whether John
Bellingham is, after all, really dead."

"My dear sir," said he, "I fail to see your point. If it were certain
that the man was alive, it would be impossible to presume that he was
dead; and if it were certain that he was dead, presumption of death
would still be impossible. You do not presume a certainty. The
uncertainty is of the essence of the transaction."

"But," I persisted, "if you really believe that he may be alive, I
should hardly have thought that you would take the responsibility of
presuming his death and dispersing his property."

"I don't," said Mr. Jellicoe. "I take no responsibility. I act in
accordance with the decision of the Court and have no choice in the
matter."

"But the Court may decide that he is dead and he may nevertheless be
alive."

"Not at all. If the Court decides that he is presumably dead, then he
is presumably dead. As a mere irrelevant, physical circumstance he
may, it is true, be alive. But legally speaking, and for testamentary
purposes, he is dead. You fail to perceive the distinction, no doubt?"

"I am afraid I do," I admitted.

"Yes; the members of your profession usually do. That is what makes
them such bad witnesses in a court of law. The scientific outlook is
radically different from the legal. The man of science relies on his
own knowledge and observation and judgment, and disregards testimony.
A man comes to you and tells you he is blind in one eye. Do you accept
his statement? Not in the least. You proceed to test his eyesight
with some infernal apparatus of colored glasses, and you find that he
can see perfectly well with both eyes. Then you decide that he is not
blind in one eye; that is to say, you reject his testimony in favor of
facts of your own ascertaining."

"But sure